poor management. How d o w e expect CEO pay to respond to this change in the legal environment? In the contracting model, where shareholders set CEO pay, the main e ect of the anti-takeover laws should be on pay for performance. Shareholders, seeing the weakening of one disciplining mechanism, should respond by strengthening another, pay for performance. In the skimming model, on the other hand, the main e ect should be on mean pay. CEOs facing a reduced threat of a hostile takeover can now skim more resources from their rm.
In Bertrand and Mullainathan 1999a, using panel data on about 600 rms between 1984 and 1991, we study the impact of the legislative c hanges on the level of CEO pay and its sensitivity to performance. We focus on the adoption by states of Business Combination Statutes. These statutes impose a moratorium period 3 to 5 years on speci ed transactions between the target and a raider holding a certain threshold percentage of stock unless the board votes otherwise. They were adopted by several states at di erent times through the 1980s and early 1990s. The staggering of the laws over time allows us to identify the e ect of the laws after controlling for year and rm xed e ects.
For the full sample, we found an increase in mean pay and an increase in pay for performance especially for accounting measures of performance. These results are intriguing because they are consistent with both views of CEO pay. Mean pay rises as the skimming model would have predicted but pay for performance also rises as the contracting model would have predicted.
To help resolve this ambiguity, w e look more closely at which rms experienced the increases in mean pay and in pay for performance. We focus on how rms with di erent corporate governance are a ected by the new laws. More speci cally, w e separate the rms in our sample into two groups based on whether the rm has a large shareholder present or not. Large shareholders are very often thought to be an e ective g o v ernance mechanism and are an easy way to measure corporate governance given the available data Shleifer and Vishny, 1986 . We de ne a large shareholder as an owner who has a block of at least ve percent of common shares in the sample base year. Blocks that are owned by the CEO are, of course, excluded. Table 1 reports our ndings for mean pay. The dependent variable is the logarithm of total CEO compensation. Each regression includes, in addition to a dummy variable for the adoption of a Business Combination Statute, year xed e ects, rm xed e ects, a quadratic in CEO age, a quadratic in CEO tenure, the logarithm of total assets and the logarithm of total employment. Column 1 focuses on rms with a large shareholder. In these rms, we see a statistically insigni cant increase in mean pay of only 2 following the laws. Column 2 focuses on rms without a large shareholder.
For these rms, in contrast, CEO pay grew by this time a statistically signi cant 7.5. The increase in mean pay was actually quite heterogeneous. While rms without a large shareholder experienced a large increase, rms with a large shareholder experienced almost no increase.
In Table 2 , we similarly break apart the pay for performance results. Here we nd the opposite e ect.
The increase in the sensitivity o f p a y to accounting performance is concentrated among the rms with a large shareholder. Firms without one show no increase in pay for performance.
We have just shown that in response to the passage of anti-takeover legislation, rms with a large shareholder increased pay for performance, while rms without a large shareholder increased mean pay.
This suggest that the two models of CEO pay need not be contrasted. Instead, they may both be true and indeed may be quite complementary. This intuition is reinforced in the additional tests that follow.
II Further Evidence
II.1 Are CEOs Rewarded for Luck?
In Bertrand and Mullainathan 1999b, we nd two further pieces of evidence. In the rst test, we examine whether CEOs are rewarded for observable luck. By luck we mean changes in rm performance that are beyond the CEO's control. In simple agency models, pay should not respond to luck since by de nition the CEO cannot in uence luck. Tying pay to luck doesn't provide better incentives the CEO can't change luck, but merely adds risk to the contract Holmstrom, 1979 . Under the skimming view, on the other hand, pay will be correlated with luck since the CEO can use lucky dollars to pay herself more.
To empirically examine the responsiveness of pay to luck, we use three di erent measures of luck. First, we perform a case study of oil extracting rms where large movements in oil prices tend to a ect rm performance on a regular basis. Second, we use changes in industry-speci c exchange rate for rms in the traded goods sector. Third, we use year-to-year di erences in mean industry performance to proxy for the overall economic fortunes of a sector. For all three measures, we nd that CEO pay responds to luck. In fact we nd that, for all three luck measures, CEO pay is as sensitive to a lucky dollar" as to a general dollar."
Most importantly, we nd that CEO pay responds less to luck i n t h e better governed rms. Similarly to our takeover results, we nd that the presence of a large shareholder reduces the amount o f p a y for luck.
Qualitatively equivalent results hold for other governance measures such as the level of CEO entrenchment measured as CEO tenure interacted with the presence of a large shareholder and board size. Again, improved governance leads to greater concordance with the contracting view, while weakened governance leads to greater concordance with the skimming view.
II.2 Are Stock Options Grants Gifts?
The second test presented in Bertrand and Mullainathan 1999b focuses on the granting of stock options.
Contract theory predicts that when stock options are granted, other components of pay should be adjusted down so that CEOs are left indi erent b e t w een the pay package containing options and the one containing no options. Supporters of the skimming view, on the other hand, would highlight the fact that stock options do not appear on balance sheets. Because of accounting rules, rms do not charge their earnings for the options they grant. CEOs can therefore pay themselves through option grants without a ecting the company's bottom line. If shareholders mainly look at this bottom line, options grants are an easy way to skim without drawing unwanted attention. Thus, the CEO who gives herself options would not need to lower the other components of pay at all. Thus, while contracting predicts a charge for options, skimming predicts little charge.
In the empirical test, we focus on the question of how the strength of governance in the rm a ects the charge for options. Using the same governance measures as in the previous test, we nd that poorly governed CEOs are charged less for their new options grants. For example, when there is no large shareholder sitting on the board, the CEO is charged less for each dollar's worth of options granted. Again, we nd greater resemblance to skimming in the poorly governed rms.
III An Independent Test
The above ndings point t o w ards the coexistence of skimming and agency models. In this section, we provide another independent test of this idea by revisiting the evidence in Aggarwal and Samwick 1999. Aggarwal and Samwick's paper starts with the following important prediction of the contracting model: the sensitivity of pay to performance should decrease as the riskiness or variance of performance increases. In support of that prediction, Aggarwal and Samwick nd that the sensitivity o f p a y to performance is larger in rms with less volatile stock prices.
In the context of what we have shown before, a natural question arises: Does the tradeo between performance volatility and pay-performance sensitivity appear stronger in the better governed rms? We test this hypothesis using a CEO compensation data that covers 792 di erent corporations over the [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] period, provided to us by David Yermack. Compensation data was collected from the corporations' SEC Proxy, 10-K, and 8-K lings. Other data was transcribed from the Forbes magazine annual survey of CEO compensation as well as from SEC Registration statements, rms' Annual Reports, direct correspondence with rms, press reports of CEO hires and departures, and stock prices published by Standard & Poor's.
Firms were selected into the sample on the basis of their Forbes rankings. Forbes magazine publishes annual rankings of the top 500 rms on four dimensions: sales, pro ts, assets and market value. To qualify for the sample a corporation must appear in one of these Forbes 500 rankings at least four times between 1984 and 1991. In addition, the corporation must have been publicly traded for four consecutive y ears between 1984 and 1991. While this data set covers a smaller set of companies than the Execucomp database used by Aggarwal and Samwick, it does contain some information on the structure of corporate ownership, which is not available in Execucomp.
The dependent v ariable, total CEO compensation, is de ned as the sum of salary, b o n us, other compensa-tion and the value of options granted in that year. It is a measure of ow compensation. Unlike Execucomp, Yermack's data does not contain information on the value of stock options and equity shares held by CEOs.
In practice, we use the logarithm of total compensation. We use the real rate of return to shareholders percentage change in the real value of shareholder wealth, including dividend payments as our measure of performance.
Our risk measure is based on the sample variance of daily stock returns for the last 120 days of the scal year. Following Aggarwal and Samwick, we use the cumulative distribution function CDF of the variance of returns in the sample as our risk measure. The smallest observed variance in the sample has a CDF value of 0; the largest observed variance has a CDF value of 1.
We follow Bertrand and Mullainathan 1999a and split our original sample into two subsamples of rms based on whether or not they have at least one block of at least ve percent of common shares in the sample base year 1984, whether the block holder is or is not a director. As before, we exclude blocks that are owned by the CEO.
The results for the full sample, not reported here, match the ndings in Aggarwal and Samwick 1999.
CEO pay becomes less sensitive to the rate of return to shareholders as the volatility of stock returns increases. In Table 3 , we show h o w the presence of a large shareholder mediates these ndings. Regressions are estimated by OLS. Each regression contains as independent v ariables the performance measure, the risk measure and the interaction of performance with risk. This interaction term is what allows us to understand the e ect of risk on the pay to performance sensitivity. In addition, we include rm xed e ects, year xed e ects, a quadratic in CEO age and a quadratic in CEO tenure but do not report these coe cients in the Table. Column 1 focuses on rms with a large shareholder present. Here we nd support for the contracting model. Higher variance means lower pay for performance sensitivity. Column 2 focuses on the rms where there is no large shareholder present. For this group, there is no relationship: the pay for performance sensitivity does not depend on the riskiness of the stock. Hence the existing nding that the variance of performance a ects the sensitivity of pay t o performance appears to be coming from the better governed rms in the sample.
IV Synthesizing the Empirical Findings
We h a v e so far laid out a set of empirical facts that support the general claim that better governed rms behave according to the contracting model while worse governed ones behave according to the skimming model. A k ey to moving forward will be to develop a model that is consistent with all these facts.
A v ery rst concern that needs to be addressed is whether our ndings represent a spurious relationship.
The apparent correlation between the use of optimal CEO compensation contracts and the presence of large shareholders might not re ect a true direct relationship. Instead, skimming and weak governance might b e related to each other through some third factor that we are not observing or are not adequately controlling
for. But what could this third factor be? Firm size might be one example. Owning 5 percent of the shares of a large rm is more expensive so that large rms typically have less large shareholders. We can, of course, appropriately control for size in the above tests and when we did so the results did not change. The deeper question, however, is why a third factor such as size would consistently lead to the pattern of responses that we see. For example, why would larger rms which would be correlated with poorer governance respond to takeover legislation with greater mean pay and less pay for performance increases, reward their CEOs more for luck, charge their CEOs less for options and not account for variance in choosing the pay for performance sensitivity? If it is not because of poorer governance, then why? It is always a possibility that some unobserved factor drives our results. We simply nd it hard to point t o a n y such factor that would intuitively match the consistent patterns that we observe.
Assuming that these results are indeed about governance, the simplest way to explain them seems to be through a bargaining model. Suppose shareholders and the CEO bargain over the pay package. Skimming could then be modeled as the case where the CEO has much or all of the bargaining power. Contracting would be the case where shareholders have m uch or all of the power. Such a bargaining model would also have the added feature of being able to deal with a continuum of possibilities between skimming and contracting.
While intuitively appealing, this model cannot match the results above. To see why, note that the Coase Theorem applies in this model. The bargaining power of the CEO will only determine how m uch a v erage pay she gets, not the structure of her contract. A CEO with more bargaining power will not choose to get more pay for luck. She will also have luck shocks removed from her pay but will simply expect a higher average compensation. Similarly, there is no reason that she would want t o b e c harged less for options grants. She will want to face the same charge for options but merely take a bigger compensation package overall. More generally, the optimal contract will always be chosen with bargaining power simply determining the division of rents between the shareholders and the CEO.
An alternative modeling approach could be to focus on the superior monitoring technology of large shareholders. Our ndings could be the result of an optimal contracting process where principals always set pay, whether governance is weak or strong, but face di erent signal to noise ratios when evaluating CEO e ort. In rms with large shareholders, principals can more easily separate CEOs' e ort from other noisy movements in rm performance. Such a view could potentially explain why there is more pay for luck i n rms without large shareholders. One would, however, need to assume that observing movements in oil prices or in aggregate industry shocks requires superior monitoring technology and cannot be done easily, for example by opening the business section of the daily newspaper.
The monitoring model cannot at all explain our ndings on the impact of takeover threats. Why w ould principals in rms without large shareholders decide to give higher pay once CEOs are protected from hostile raiders? Their monitoring technology may be weaker but they still know the laws have been passed and should react to them. Similarly, the trade-o between incentive p a y and variance of pay are equally puzzling.
If anything, it is the principals of the well governed who should care less about stock market price volatility since they have access to better signals of e ort. As a whole, it is hard to imagine how di erences in monitoring alone could explain the array of results.
Thus our ndings suggest that governance is not just about increased bargaining power or better monitoring. Instead, they suggest that governance is about who has e ective control. In contracting models, we always assume that some metaphorical principal controls the pay process. Even when governance is weak, this principal still sets pay perhaps taking into account a w orse monitoring technology. Our results suggest that a better model of governance would be one that recognizes that good governance is what allows shareholders to maintain e ective control of, for example, the pay process.
To be concrete, consider the details of the pay process. In practice, CEO pay is usually set via the compensation committee. This committee may cater to the interests of the CEO or of the shareholders.
When governance is good, such as when there is a large shareholder present, this committee may make sure that the pay package looks optimal from the shareholders' perspective. The committee will respond to the passage of takeover legislation, or will be more reluctant to raise the CEO's bonus just because oil prices rose and so on.
When governance is weak, however, this committee may b e m uch more willing to cater to the CEO. How does the committee set pay then? Even though the CEO has de facto control of this committee, she still faces constraints. The committee may be quite reluctant to attract the attention of shareholders or of other important constituencies, such as labor unions or the business press. This places constraints not just on how m uch can be skimmed but also on how skimming will take place. For example, more can be skimmed when rms' performance is high as shareholders may be paying even less attention to the rm. Pay for luck then naturally arises. Also, if shareholders mostly pay attention to their company's bottom line, the compensation committee will grant relatively more stock options as they are not charged directly against earnings.
V Conclusion
This discussion highlights a set of open questions as we m o v e forward from the empirical regularities above.
First, we need to better understand what happens when the CEO has gained de facto control of the pay process. What are the real constraints on pay setting? This will require a more rigorous formalization of the skimming view. Second, we need to reinterpret what corporate governance actually does. We need to reconceptualize governance as the transfer of de facto control of important decisions from the CEO to the shareholders. Such a reconceptualization will have applications beyond executive compensation. Take for example the decision by rms to adopt takeover protection such as poison pills. Should we think this decision is made with the interests of shareholders or management in mind? This question is somewhat analogous to whether we think CEO pay is the result of optimal contracting or skimming. Perhaps governance plays a central role in this application too, with well governed rms using poison pills to raise bargaining power during takeover attempts and poorly governed rms using poison pills to entrench management. This nal example highlights the broader value of a reconceptualization of good governance as being what gives CEOs principals. 1. Large Shareholder" is a dummy v ariable that equals 1 Yes" if the rm has a strictly positive n umber of blocks of at least ve percent of common shares in the base year 1984, whether the block holder is or is not a director. Blocks of at least ve percent that are owned by CEOs are excluded. 2. Anti-Takeover Law Adopted" is a dummy v ariable that equals 1 after the adoption of an anti-takeover law Business Combination Statute by the state the rm is incorporated in. 3. Each regression includes as controls year xed e ects, rm xed e ects, a quadratric in CEO age, a quadratic in CEO tenure, the logarithm of total assets and the logarithm of total employment. 4. denotes signi cance at the 5. 1. Large Shareholder" is de ned as in Table 1. 2. Anti-Takeover Law Adopted" is de ned as in Table 1. 3. Accounting Rate of Return is the ratio of Net Income over Total Assets. It has been demeaned. 4. Each regression includes as controls year xed e ects, accounting rate of return interacted with year xed e ects, rm xed e ects, a quadratric in CEO age, a quadratic in CEO tenure, the logarithm of total assets and the logarithm of total employment. 5. denotes signi cance at the 5; at the 1. 
